For them, the intellect is a substance that subsists in its own right, is described as neither moving nor at rest, and undergoes no new states whatsoever. What their position actually entails is that, once the soul separates from the body, no new state arises in it: no knowledge or conceptions, no hearing or sight, no volitions, no joy or delight, nor anything else that might newly arise or occur. Rather, according to them, it remains in a single state from eternity to eternity, as they claim concerning the intellect and the soul.

Some of them say that souls are numerically one, while others say that they are multiple. Their discourse contains falsehoods that this is not the place to discuss at length. The purpose here is only to draw attention to what is relevant to the present discussion.

They call whatever is associated with matter—that is, hayūlā, which here means body—a soul, such as the human soul that governs the body. They claim that the celestial sphere has a soul that moves it, just as human beings have souls. Their earlier thinkers, however, used to say that the soul of the celestial sphere is an accident inhering in the sphere, like the souls of beasts, and just as desire and anger inhere in a human being. But some of them, such as Ibn Sīnā and others, claimed that the soul of the celestial sphere is a substance subsisting in its own right, like the human soul.

As long as the human soul governs the body, they call it a soul; once it separates from the body, they call it an intellect. This is because, for them, the intellect is that which is free of matter and material attachments, whereas the soul is attached to the body by governing and directing it.