and that the assents sought can be attained only through syllogism in the broad sense. The general category of syllogism may be called “relation,” just as the general category of explanatory discourse is called “definition.” What is self-evident in either category requires neither definition nor demonstration. This account thus maintains that definitions enable us to conceive realities, and that this cannot be achieved otherwise; and that syllogism yields assent concerning realities, and that this cannot be achieved otherwise. Error has occurred in both matters. As regards definition, the error lies in both propositions, negative and affirmative—in what they affirm and what they deny.

As for the first:

A definition does not convey a conception of realities; it merely distinguishes what is defined from other things. A conception of realities cannot be acquired merely through a definition, which consists of the definer’s words. Rather, those realities must be apprehended through inward and outward perception. If they are not apprehended, an illustrative example is given of them. Through that example—an analogy serving to form a conception, not to establish assent—a kind of apprehension is attained, such as our apprehension of the reward and punishment Allah has promised in the Hereafter. The parables set forth in the Quran sometimes serve to form conceptions and sometimes to establish assent. This point has been established in several ways; the purpose here is merely to summarize the matter.

As for the second, namely the negative claim, apprehending realities conceived in the abstract does not depend on definition, even if it were granted that they could be known through definition. Rather, such conceptions are attained through the recognized means of apprehension.