by means other than syllogistic reasoning. Both cases occur: such knowledge is absent among them, since they have no method other than syllogistic reasoning, whereas the prophets and their followers possess it. Indeed, such knowledge is possessed, in general, by all those endowed with knowledge among the angels, the prophets, and other human beings.

Furthermore, since syllogistic reasoning must contain a universal premise, if that premise requires reasoning, it will require another premise. If it is self-evident, then, if all the individual cases it covers can be known self-evidently, what prevents some of those cases from being known in this way—an easier task?

As for definition, it calls for discussion on several points.

First: their claim that concepts acquired through reasoning can be known only through the kind of definition they describe. The same applies here as to their claim that judgments acquired through reasoning can be attained only through the demonstrative proof whose premises they have restricted to certain kinds. There is no evidence for this.

The weakness of this claim is shown by the following: if the person giving a definition knows the thing being defined through someone else’s definition, circular reasoning or an infinite regress necessarily follows. If he knows it without a definition, the claim is disproved.

If it is said, “Rather, he knows it through the definition formed in his own mind, just as he attains propositional knowledge through the demonstrative proof formed in his mind before expressing it in words,” the reply is that a demonstrative proof is distinct from its conclusion: knowledge of the two premises is not itself knowledge of the conclusion. The definition formed in the mind, however, is itself knowledge of the thing being defined—and that is precisely what is sought. Where, then, is the definition that imparts knowledge of the thing being defined? This is one of the points that makes the matter clear.