an essential attribute of it according to their own principles. Indeed, none of these is an attribute of the proposition in itself; rather, they are relative attributes depending on someone’s awareness of it. It is well known that a proposition may be true without a person even being aware of it, let alone considering it probable or knowing it to be true. Likewise, a proposition may be rhetorical or dialectical while being true in itself; indeed, it may also be demonstrative, as they themselves have acknowledged.
Since this is so, the Messengers—may Allah’s blessings be upon them—conveyed propositions that are true in themselves and can never be false or erroneous. They also explained generally accessible methods of knowing by which the truth of propositions can be established, thus benefiting humankind. This is knowledge that benefits people.
These would-be philosophers, however, did not follow this path. Instead, they approached propositions in relative terms: they classified as demonstrative whatever the person reasoning knew, and did not classify anything else as demonstrative, even if another person reasoning knew it. Accordingly, propositions considered demonstrative by one person or group may not be considered demonstrative by others. Propositions known to be true therefore cannot be encompassed by a comprehensive definition; rather, they vary according to the circumstances of those who know them and those who do not. Indeed, practitioners of each discipline know propositions that others do not.
Consequently, their method cannot distinguish truth from error or true statements from false ones on the basis of how matters actually stand—what is true or erroneous, truthful or false—within each discipline. Nor can its benefit be shared by all human beings. This is unlike the method of the Prophets, who conveyed true propositions that distinguish truth from error