shared by the primary and secondary cases. Whatever establishes the truth of the major premise also establishes that the shared attribute necessarily entails the judgment. Thus, the major term’s following necessarily from the middle term is the same as the judgment’s following necessarily from the shared attribute.

If you say:

“Nabīdh is forbidden by analogy with wine, because wine was forbidden only because it is intoxicating, and this attribute is present in nabīdh,”

this is equivalent to saying: “All nabīdh is intoxicating, and whatever is intoxicating is forbidden.”

The conclusion is your statement: “Nabīdh is forbidden.” “Nabīdh” is its subject and the minor term; “forbidden” is its predicate and the major term. “Intoxicating” mediates between the subject and predicate and is the middle term: the predicate of the minor premise and the subject of the major premise.

If you say:

“Nabīdh is forbidden by analogy with grape wine, because the cause in the primary case is its intoxicating effect, which is also present in the secondary case; the prohibition therefore applies because its cause is present,”

you have inferred the prohibition of nabīdh from its intoxicating effect, which is the middle term. In reasoning by analogy, however, you have additionally mentioned the primary case through which the ruling on the secondary case is established. This is because the mind’s awareness of a case analogous to the secondary case yields firmer knowledge than merely subsuming it under the universal shared attribute. Once evidence establishes the efficacy of the shared attribute, mentioning the primary case is unnecessary.

Analogy necessarily proceeds either by identifying the shared attribute or by eliminating any relevant difference. The “shared attribute” is either the cause or an indication of it. In analogy based on eliminating any relevant difference, that elimination is itself the middle term.