—as in the case of the crocodile. The former is useful in matters of certainty, unlike the latter, although the latter is useful in dialectical reasoning. As for ‘reasoning by analogy,’ it consists in assigning to one thing the judgment assigned to another on the basis of a shared feature. For example, they say: ‘The world exists, so it is eternal, like the Creator’; or, ‘It is corporeal, so it was brought into existence, like a human being.’ Such reasoning comprises a secondary case, a primary case, a cause, and a judgment. In these examples, the secondary case is the world; the primary case is the Creator or a human being; the cause is existence or corporeality; and the judgment is being eternal or having been brought into existence.”

They said:

“It differs from induction in that the subject of its judgment may be a particular, whereas the subject of a judgment reached through induction can only be a universal.”

They said:

“It does not yield certainty. Two things sharing a common feature need not also share the judgment assigned to one of them, unless that common feature is shown to be the cause of that judgment. Yet everything offered to establish this yields only probability. For, according to those who accept this method, the supporting arguments in rational matters are confined to co-presence and co-absence, and division and elimination.

“As for co-presence and co-absence, this means nothing more than the necessary concomitance of the judgment and its cause, both in their presence and in their absence. Establishing this necessarily requires induction, but there is no way to claim it for the secondary case, since it is not