and stated that he had addressed some adherents of the doctrine of authoritative teaching in this manner. He also wrote a book on their incoherence and explained their unbelief on account of their position on the eternity of the world, their denial of knowledge of particulars, and their denial of the resurrection. In his final writings, he explained that their method was unsound and did not lead to certainty, condemning it more severely than the method of the speculative theologians.

Earlier, he had included much of their discourse in his books, either in their own words or in different wording. Toward the end of his life, however, he condemned them vehemently. He explained that their method contained ignorance and unbelief warranting its condemnation, and that it was more corrupt than the method of the speculative theologians. He died while engaged in studying the works of al-Bukhārī and Muslim. As for the logic about which he had said so much, it neither enabled him to attain his goal nor dispelled his doubt and bewilderment. Logic availed him nothing.

Yet because of what he had done during his lifetime, and for other reasons, many thinkers began incorporating Greek logic into their disciplines. Thus, later thinkers who follow their approach come to believe that there is no other way, and that their claims concerning definition and demonstration are sound and accepted by rational people. Such a person does not know that rational and learned people, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, have continually criticized and challenged these claims.

Muslim thinkers have written numerous works on this subject. The majority of Muslims criticize it in general terms because of the effects and consequences they observe: these reveal in its practitioners qualities contrary to knowledge and faith, and their condition leads them into various forms of ignorance, unbelief, and misguidance.

The point here is that their claim that every conclusion sought depends on two premises, and no more,