is harmful rather than beneficial because of the ignorance or excessive prolixity it contains. Since reasoning sometimes depends on one premise, sometimes on two, and sometimes on several, Muslim thinkers have followed the practice of providing whatever evidence they need to establish the premises. They do not undertake to state two premises in every argument, as those who follow the logicians’ path do. Rather, the writings of Muslim thinkers and preachers, and their practice both in reasoning for themselves and in debating with others—whether to teach, guide, or dispute—follow the approach I have described. The same applies to all other kinds of rational people, whether adherents of religious communities or otherwise, except those who follow these logicians’ path.

Muslim thinkers have continually criticized the logicians’ method, exposing its inarticulacy, awkwardness of expression, deficient reasoning, and inability to articulate thought. They explain that it is more likely to corrupt reasoning and speech than to rectify them. They refuse to follow it in their own reasoning or in debate, whether with allies or adversaries.

Its use became widespread only from the time of Abū Hāmid. He placed an introduction to Greek logic at the beginning of his book al-Mustasfā and claimed that only someone acquainted with this logic could have confidence in his own knowledge. He also wrote Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm (The Criterion of Knowledge) and Mihakk al-Nazar (The Touchstone of Reasoning) on the subject. He wrote another book, which he called al-Qistās al-Mustaqīm (The Just Balance), in which he presented five balances: the three categorical forms, the conjunctive conditional form, and the disjunctive conditional form. He recast their formulations as examples drawn from the discourse of Muslims.