how the first two combine, leading to the consideration of infinitely many premises. If, however, this is not an item of knowledge distinct from the two premises, it cannot be a condition for drawing the conclusion, since a condition is distinct from what it conditions. Here there is no such distinction, so it cannot be a condition. As for the example of the female mule, that is possible only when just one of the two premises is present in the mind—either the minor or the major premise. When both are present together in the mind, we do not concede that any doubt about the conclusion is possible at all.”

I say:

“The truth of the matter” is that this dispute arose from their assumption that two premises are necessary, not from the inferential process itself, since a condition is distinct from what it conditions. But that is not how matters stand. Rather, what is needed is whatever establishes the conclusion sought, whether one premise, two, or three. What one has lost sight of is not known while one remains heedless of it; once one recalls it, it becomes actual knowledge.

Here, the proof is the knowledge that a female mule does not give birth. He had lost sight of this premise, so he did not know it in the manner required for it to serve as proof. Something overlooked does not serve as proof while it remains overlooked; it does so only when recalled, for only then is it knowledge present to the mind.

The Lord, Most High, is free of heedlessness and forgetfulness, because these contradict the very reality of knowledge. Likewise, He is free of drowsiness and sleep, because these contradict the perfection of His life and His being the Self-Subsisting Sustainer of all. Sleep is the brother of death; hence the people of Paradise do not sleep, just as they do not die. They are inspired to glorify Allah just as we are inspired to breathe.