several syllogisms.
You may then be told:
If you claim that what is indispensable is just one syllogism comprising two premises, and that anything beyond this amounts to further syllogisms, each establishing one of the premises, then say instead that what is indispensable is one premise, and that any additional premises serve only to establish that premise. This is more reasonable. For if an attribute’s belonging to its bearer—that is, a judgment’s applying to its subject, a grammatical predicate’s applying to its subject, or a logical predicate’s applying to its subject—can be known only through an intermediary between the two, namely the evidence, then what is indispensable is one premise. Anything beyond that may or may not be needed.
As for claiming that a syllogism consisting of two premises is needed because some questions require it, this is like claiming that three, four, or five premises are needed in some questions because some questions require them. There is no more reason to prescribe one number than another. What they say about omitting one of the two premises because it is obvious, or in order to mislead, applies equally to omitting a third or fourth premise. Anyone who argues for a conclusion using one premise that is insufficient on its own to establish it—or two or three premises that are insufficient—is asked to supply whatever further premises are needed to make the argument sufficient.
Once the premises have been stated, those open to denial are denied, and those open to counterargument are countered, until the reasoning is complete. Thus, someone asked for evidence that a particular drink is forbidden says, “This is forbidden.” When asked, “Why?” he replies, “Because it is an intoxicating fermented drink.” Thus, this