That is why these philosophers found acceptance only among those furthest removed from reason and religion, “such as the Qarmatians and the Bātiniyyah,” who combined Greek philosophy with the religion of the Magians to construct their doctrine, while outwardly professing Rāfidī Shiism; and among ignorant Sufis and speculative theologians. They find acceptance only under a regime steeped in ignorance and far removed from knowledge and faith—whether among unbelievers or hypocrites. Thus, those of them who gained acceptance did so among godless hypocrites, and then among the polytheist Turks. Likewise, they invariably find acceptance only among the enemies of Allah and His Messenger, whether unbelievers or hypocrites.

Our discussion now concerns the argument they advanced to establish that a proof must contain two premises, neither more nor fewer. Its weakness has already become clear.

Then, when they recognized that a proof may require several premises, while a single premise may sometimes suffice, they said that an additional proposition—that is, a third premise beyond the two—may sometimes be inserted into a syllogism for an unsound or sound purpose, such as establishing the two premises. They call this a compound syllogism.

They said that it comprises several syllogisms presented to establish more than one proposition, although only one of these is sought in its own right.

They also said that one of the premises may sometimes be omitted, either because it is already known or for an unsound purpose. They divided compound syllogisms into disconnected and connected forms.

The response is: This is an admission on your part that some propositions require several premises to establish them, while for others a single premise suffices. Yet you then said that what requires several premises is equivalent to