any son, nor has there ever been any deity with Him. Otherwise, each deity would have taken away what it created, and some would have overcome others.”

There are similar examples—which are syllogisms—whose import is to negate an antecedent because its necessary consequent is absent, or something of that kind.

For this reason, the knowledge concerning divine lordship attained by philosophers and speculative theologians who employ syllogistic reasoning is predominantly knowledge of negations. Yet they did not confine themselves to what reason can know through syllogisms; they went beyond it. They thus made denials resembling faulty syllogistic reasoning, such as denying the attributes conveyed in prophetic reports. Indeed, the philosophers and the Muʿtazilah even deny the attributes affirmed by theologians who uphold the divine attributes. These theologians call them “rational attributes” because they establish them through rational syllogisms.

It is well known that, through syllogistic reasoning, the intellect can negate only the common element signified by the universal proposition indispensable to a syllogism. For example, it may negate will, mercy, or knowledge insofar as it is shared by the things bearing that name. In created beings, this common element is accompanied by qualities that do not apply to Allah Most High. They therefore deny the unqualified common meaning applicable to both the attributes of the True One and those of His creatures—because they deny what is peculiar to creatures—and thus negate the divine attributes. Likewise, those who liken Him to His creatures affirm what is peculiar to creatures on account of the common element. Both are faulty syllogisms.

Thus, in these attributes—and indeed in the essences themselves—there are three aspects to consider:

First: what is peculiar to the Lord’s essence and attributes.

Second: what is peculiar to the creature and its attributes.