The point is this: you say that a proof—that is, a syllogism—consists of exactly two parts. If you mean only two expressions, and that anything beyond two expressions constitutes several proofs rather than one, on the grounds that each attribute qualifying an expression requires its own proof, then the reply is:

The same could be said of the two expressions: they constitute two proofs, not one, since each premise requires a proof. Restricting the number to two, rather than allowing more, is therefore an arbitrary stipulation without any meaningful basis. For the intended point may be conveyed by a single expression, or it may require two, three, four, or more. To insist that two expressions are the required norm, to the exclusion of both more and fewer, and to treat anything additional as multiple propositions if it concerns what is to be established, or as equivalent to multiple syllogisms if it consists of premises stated in the proof, is sheer arbitrariness. It is no more justified than saying:

“Rather, the norm is that there should be one proposition to establish, with a proof consisting of a single part. If what is to be established exceeds this, it is treated as two, three, or four propositions, according to its import.”

If this were said, it would be better than their position, because the term “proof” is singular, so what it denotes should likewise be single; and a syllogism is a proof.

The word “qiyās” (syllogism) implies measurement, as when one says, “I measured this against that.” Measurement can be made against one thing. If something is measured against two or three things, however, there are two or three measurements, not one. Those measurements would therefore constitute several syllogisms, not a single syllogism. Thus, their treating more than two premises as equivalent to several syllogisms, and fewer than two as half of a