desired conclusion, it achieves the intended purpose. Our statement that nabīdh is wine is relevant to the desired conclusion, as is our statement that a human being is an animal. Suppose someone knows that all wine is forbidden but is uncertain whether the disputed nabīdh is called wine in the Lawgiver’s usage. If he is told that nabīdh is forbidden because it is established in the Sahīh that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said:

“Every intoxicant is wine,”

then the proposition—namely, our statement that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, “Every intoxicant is wine”—establishes that nabīdh is forbidden, even if the statement itself contains another proposition.

Drawing this inference depends on premises already known to the listener: that whatever hadith scholars have authenticated must be believed to have been said by the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace; that whatever the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, has forbidden is forbidden; and so forth. If we were required to mention everything on which knowledge depends, even when it is already known, the premises would number more than two; indeed, they might exceed ten.

According to their position, everyone who argues from the words of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, ought to say: “The Prophet forbade this, and whatever he forbade is forbidden. Therefore, this is forbidden.” Likewise, he would say: “The Prophet made this obligatory, and whatever the Prophet made obligatory is obligatory.”

Thus, when arguing that marrying mothers, daughters, and the like is forbidden, one would need to say: “Allah has forbidden this in the Quran, and whatever Allah has forbidden is forbidden.” And when arguing for the obligation of prayer, zakat, and Hajj on the basis of such words of Allah as:

“Pilgrimage to the House is a duty owed to Allah by mankind,”

he would say: “Allah has made Hajj obligatory in