than these men, nor further removed from knowledge of Allah Most High. Admittedly, much of what they say about natural philosophy is sound. Their discussions of it are extensive, and they possess the intellectual faculties through which they acquired that knowledge. They may indeed seek the truth, without displaying obstinate resistance to it. Yet they are profoundly ignorant of divine matters, possessing only a little knowledge of them, riddled with errors.

When Ibn Sīnā acquired some knowledge of the Muslims’ religion—having received what he did from the heretics and from those better than them among the Muʿtazilah and the Rāfidah—he sought to reconcile what he had understood through reason from these men with what he had inherited from his philosophical predecessors. Among his innovations were his discussions of prophethood, the mysteries of signs and dreams, and even certain questions of natural philosophy, as well as his discussions of the Necessary Existent and similar matters. Aristotle and his followers, by contrast, make no mention in their writings of the Necessary Existent or of any properties belonging to the Necessary Existent. They speak only of “the First Cause,” establishing its existence as the final cause of celestial motion: the celestial sphere moves in order to resemble it.

Ibn Sīnā thus made some improvements to that corrupt philosophy, until it gained acceptance among students of rational inquiry who knew the religion of Islam. Some of its contradictions began to become apparent to them, and each addressed them according to the knowledge he possessed. Yet they conceded to the philosophers certain false premises in logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, without recognizing the falsehood embedded in them. This led them astray concerning lofty questions of faith and sublime Quranic aims, and thereby they departed