existent things, nor has it become an intelligible world corresponding to the existing world. Rather, it has become a world of posited universals through which nothing of the existing world is known. What good is there in this, let alone perfection?
Second: The noblest of existent beings is the “Necessary Existent,” whose existence is particular, not universal. Conceiving a universal does not preclude its being shared by many, whereas conceiving the Necessary Existent precludes such sharing. If, however, one does not know of Him that which, when conceived, precludes such sharing, but knows only a universal feature common to Him and others, then one has not known the Necessary Existent.
The same applies to what they call “intellectual substances”: the ten intellects—or more, according to those among them who hold that there are more, such as al-Suhrawardī, who was put to death, Abū al-Barakāt, and others. These are all particular substances, not universals. Thus, if we know only universals, we know none of them.
Likewise, the celestial spheres, which they maintain have neither beginning nor end, would remain unknown if we knew only universals. We would therefore know neither the Necessary Existent, nor the intellects, nor any of the souls, nor the celestial spheres, nor the elements, nor generated beings. Yet these comprise all existent things according to them. What knowledge is there here through which the soul attains perfection?
Third: Their division of the sciences into natural science, mathematics, and metaphysics, and their ranking of mathematics above natural science and metaphysics above mathematics, are among the ways in which they have turned realities upside down. For natural science—which is knowledge of bodies existing in external reality and of the principle of (1)