in assessing the validity of the analogy. An objector may deny that the attribute exists in the original case, deny the ruling in the original case, deny that the attribute exists in the case under consideration, or deny that the attribute is the effective cause of the ruling. He may say:

“We do not grant that the shared attribute you have mentioned is the effective cause or an indication of that cause.”

There must therefore be evidence establishing this: a text, consensus, enumeration and elimination, suitability, or concomitance—where such reasoning is accepted as evidence. Whatever establishes that the shared attribute entails the ruling, whether as its effective cause or as an indication of that cause, also establishes that the middle term entails the major term, and thus establishes the validity of the major premise. If it establishes the effective cause, it is a causal demonstration; if it establishes an indication of that cause, it is a demonstration from an indication. If it yields only conjecture rather than certain knowledge, then the major premise in that syllogism likewise remains merely conjectural. This is clear. Hence many jurists have come to employ syllogistic reasoning in jurisprudence, just as analogical reasoning is employed in rational inquiries. The essential nature of the one is the same as that of the other.

Some later proponents of speculative theology and reasoned opinion, such as Abū al-Maʿālī, Abū Hāmid, al-Rāzī, Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī, and others, maintain that analogy has no place in rational matters, but applies only to matters of religious law; in rational matters, however, reliance is on evidence that establishes the conclusion, without restriction. Their position contradicts that of Muslim rational thinkers—indeed, that of all other people of reason. For analogy is used as evidence in rational matters just as it is in matters of religious law. Once it is established that the shared attribute entails the ruling, this is