the Lawgiver. According to the majority of scholars, who prohibit every intoxicant, the two terms are coextensive in his usage, in both their general and particular applications. The purpose here is not to establish “the legal question,” but to draw attention to the example, for Muslim scholars who have written on logic frequently use it.

Logicians give examples using a form stripped of its subject matter, signifying nothing specific, so that knowledge of the example is not derived from a concrete instance. Thus they say:

Every A is B, and every B is C.
Therefore, every A is C.

Yet the aim is to obtain the knowledge sought concerning specific subject matter. When that subject matter is removed, someone may suppose that this procedure is necessary in particular cases. This is not so. Rather, when they are asked to establish knowledge of the two universal premises in all their rational inquiries not derived from those protected from error, you find them appealing to evidence that also makes it possible to know the particulars under investigation without knowing the universal proposition. Knowledge of those particulars therefore does not depend on demonstration.

Propositions conveyed by the prophets do not require the rational syllogism that they call demonstration. Nor does knowledge acquired through reason require their demonstrative syllogism. It is therefore needed neither in matters known through revelation nor in those known through reason. Hence, it cannot be maintained that knowledge is acquired only through the demonstrative syllogism they describe.

A further clarification is that propositions based on sense perception can only be particular. Through our senses, we have perceived only the burning caused by this fire and that fire; we have not perceived that every fire burns. If we turn this into a universal proposition and say, “Every fire burns,” we would have no way