the universal proposition without which, according to them, demonstration cannot be complete. Thus, one can know that this occurrence must have an originator and that this contingent thing must have a determining factor. If his reason doubts this and allows that he himself could come into being without an originator who brought him into being, or could exist—despite being contingent, admitting both existence and nonexistence—without a factor determining his existence, then the same possibility would apply all the more readily to other originated and contingent things. But if he is certain of this in his own case, his knowledge of the particular conclusion—namely, “This has come into existence, so it has an originator,” or “This is contingent, so it has a determining factor”—does not require a demonstrative syllogism.

This is further clarified by the following: you will find no human being seeking to establish a conclusion through reasoning and to prove it by a demonstrative syllogism whose validity he knows who could not know that conclusion without that logical demonstrative syllogism. Hence, among all other kinds of rational people, you will find no one who constructs his argument from two premises as these people do. Rather, they state the evidence that entails the conclusion. That evidence may consist of one premise, two premises, or three premises, according to the needs of the person reasoning and drawing the inference, for people’s needs differ. We have discussed this at length in our discussion of al-Muhassal.

We have also explained how the majority of rational people judge mistaken those who maintain that every instance of knowledge acquired through reasoning necessarily requires two premises, neither of which can be dispensed with, and that no more than two are needed. You should examine this using rational subject matter that is not established by the texts of the prophets, for this exposes the invalidity of their logic. If, however, you use subject matter known through the texts of the prophets, the need for the universal proposition becomes apparent, as when we wish to establish the prohibition of