Moreover, what is sought here cannot be attained through definition alone. Rather, the thing being defined must be made known by pointing to it or by some other means for which words alone do not suffice. Once it is established that simple conceptions cannot be sought, either a person already possesses them—in which case they are not acquired through definition, and definition therefore supplies no conception—or he does not possess them, in which case definition alone does not enable him to conceive of the things named when he does not know them. Whenever he has some awareness of them, he needs a definition for that awareness only in the same way that he needs a name. The point is to establish that a definition and a name serve the same purpose.

(Sixth): It may be said: According to them, what enables one to conceive of a reality is the general definition composed of essential, rather than accidental, attributes. This account rests on the distinction between the essential and the accidental. They say that the essential is what falls within the essence, while the accidental is what lies outside it. They divide the latter into what necessarily accompanies the essence and what necessarily accompanies its existence.

This account rests on two unsound principles: the distinction between an essence and its existence, and then the distinction between what is essential to it and what necessarily accompanies it.

(The first principle is their claim that an essence has an established reality outside the mind distinct from its existence. This resembles the claim that what does not exist is a thing, and is among the most untenable notions. The root of their misguidance is that they observed that a thing can be known and willed before it exists, and that a distinction can be drawn between what is within one’s power and what is beyond it, and so forth. They therefore said: “If it were not established, this would not be possible.” Likewise, we speak of the realities of