closer examination, that definitions serve the same kind of purpose as names and amount to rendering one expression by another. Al-Ghazālī states this in al-Mi‘yār (The Criterion), which he composed on logic; it is likewise found in the writings of Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, al-Suhrawardī, and others.

Explaining unfamiliar vocabulary in the Quran, hadith, and other texts belongs to this category. Indeed, interpreting the Quran and other forms of discourse belongs, at its most basic level, to this category, since the purpose is to explain what the speaker intends by those terms and that discourse. They agree that this kind of definition is a verbal definition. Yet this is precisely what is needed when teaching the sciences set out in written works—indeed, when reading any book, and in every kind of communication. Anyone reading books on grammar, medicine, or other subjects must know what their authors intend by those terms and by the statements composed of them. The same applies to anyone reading books on jurisprudence, speculative theology, philosophy, or other subjects.

Knowing these definitions is a matter of religion with respect to every expression found in the Book of Allah Most High and the Sunnah of His Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Such knowledge may be an individual obligation or a collective obligation. Hence Allah Most High censures those who do not know these limits of meaning, saying:

“The Bedouins are stronger in disbelief and hypocrisy and more likely not to know the limits of what Allah has revealed to His Messenger.”

What He revealed to His Messenger includes terms that may be “unfamiliar” to the listener, such as dīzā (unfair), qaswarah (a lion or hunters), ‘as‘asa (to fall or recede, of night), and similar expressions. A term may also be “familiar,” yet its precise limits remain unknown, while its meaning is understood only in general terms—as with the terms prayer, zakat, fasting, and Hajj.