enable them to convey conceptions of realities, they are false: through them they conflate things that differ and distinguish between things that are alike.

There are several arguments showing that definitions do not convey conceptions of realities.

First:

A definition is merely the statement and claim of the person framing it. His statement, for example, “The definition of man is a rational animal,” is a declarative proposition and a mere claim unsupported by any proof. Either the listener knows it to be true independently of this statement, or he does not. In the first case, it is established that he did not acquire this knowledge through the definition. In the second case, merely stating something without supporting evidence does not impart knowledge to him. How could it, when he knows that the speaker is not infallible in what he says? Thus, on either assumption, a definition does not impart knowledge of definitions.

If it is said:

“It gives him only a conception of what the term designates, without judging whether this is, for example, the very thing being asked about or something else.”

We reply:

“In that case, it is merely like a single term signifying its meaning—that is, a name signifying what it names.”

This confirms what we have said: a definition signifies in the same way that a name does. A mere name does not give someone a conception of what it names unless he has already conceived it independently of that name. This is undisputed, and the same applies to a definition.

Second:

They say: “A definition cannot be met with a denial, nor is proof established for it; it is only possible to