any essence, either at all or in most cases. Yet essences have been conceived, so it is clear that conception has no need of definition.

(Sixth: According to them, definitions apply only to composite essences: species possessing a genus and a differentia. As for what is not composite—that which does not fall under a genus together with anything else, exemplified by some of them by the intellect—it has no definition. Yet they have defined it, and its conception is among those they seek to acquire. It is therefore clear that conception has no need of definition. Indeed, if this can be known without a definition, those species can all the more readily be known, since they are closer to the genus and their individual instances are familiar.

They say that assent does not depend on the complete conception attained through a real definition. Rather, even a minimal conception suffices, if only through a distinctive property. The conception of the intellect belongs to this category. This is an admission on their part that conception as such does not depend on a real definition.

Seventh: Unless someone hearing a definition already knows its individual terms and how they signify their respective meanings, he cannot understand the statement. Knowing that a term signifies a meaning and has been assigned to it presupposes a conception of that meaning. If he already conceives what the term designates and means before hearing it, it cannot be said that he conceives it only by hearing it.

(Eighth: If a definition is a statement made by the person defining, then it is well known that conceiving meanings