the reality and provide a conception of it. If the reality in question is expressed in words, it falls within the first category; if it is not expressed in words, it cannot be apprehended through words or defined verbally except as already explained. These are brief observations drawing attention to the main points intended; this is not the place to elaborate on them.

The sixteenth argument:

Concerning shared and distinctive essential attributes—such as animality and rationality—if by “shared” they mean that the very same attribute existing outside the mind is shared, this is false. Particular entities cannot be shared: their very conception precludes this.

If, however, by “shared” they mean that another species possesses an attribute like that one, they may be told:

Undoubtedly, human animality and equine animality have something in common. Likewise, their voices and their powers of discernment have something in common. A human being has discernment, and a horse has discernment. The former has a voice, namely speech, and the latter has a voice, namely neighing; each voice has thus been given its own distinctive name. If, then, the reality of one differs from that of the other and is peculiar to its own species, on what grounds have you made the animality of one equivalent to the animality of the other in definition and reality?

Why not say instead that their animality has both a common aspect and a distinguishing aspect, just as their voices