the substance is composed of two accidents, that is untenable. If it is composed of a general substance and a specific one, no such components exist within it. Thus, the claim that the externally existing essence is composite is invalid.

If they treat it sometimes as a substance and sometimes as an attribute, this is comparable to what the Christians say about the hypostases, which scholars agree is among the most self-contradictory positions.

If they say, “What is composite is the intelligible essence in the mind,” the first answer is that this is not what definitions seek to describe unless it corresponds to external reality. If there is no composition there, it cannot properly be attributed to the mental essence either. What is in the mind is merely the conception of a rational living being: a single substance possessing two attributes, as we explained earlier. There is therefore no composition in it whatsoever.

Know that there is no dispute that some attributes of species and genera are shared with others, as in the case of genus and common accident. Some attributes are inseparable from the essence, while others belong to it only contingently—that is, they are present at one time but not another, whether they disappear slowly or quickly. The issue is precisely the distinction between an essential attribute and an inseparable accident. This distinction rests upon the arbitrary judgment of the person formulating the definition.

Nor is there any dispute that some attributes may be more evident and nobler than others. The capacity for rational speech, for example, is nobler than the capacity for laughter. Hence Allah uses speech as a comparison when He says:

“It is indeed true, just as surely as you speak.”

The issue, however, is treating this attribute, rather than the other, as essential and as that through which the essence is conceived.