It may be replied:

Mental apprehension is relative and relational. For the mind’s inability to understand one thing before another concerns the mind’s own apprehension; it is not something inherent in the thing described. If one attribute is a constituent of the essence while the other is not, then the distinction between the essential and the accidental must rest on a feature established in reality itself, whether or not it is apprehended. Otherwise, no such distinction can be made.

The Tenth Argument:

It may be said: If the claim that the mind cannot understand one thing before another refers to particular minds—those which have conceived of matters in this way—then this constitutes no proof, because they themselves have arranged matters thus.

The claim would then amount to this: Whatever we place before the essence in our minds is essential, and whatever we place after it is accidental. The matter thus comes down to our arbitrarily treating some attributes as essential and others as accidental, whether inseparable or separable. If that is so, this distinction is nothing but an arbitrary assertion without any warrant.

It is hardly surprising that these people should conflate distinct things and distinguish between things that are alike. How often this occurs in their logical arguments, through which they have gone astray and led others astray! They were the first to corrupt the religion of the Muslims and introduce the innovations by which the Sabians altered the doctrines of rightly guided believers.

If they say:

“Rather, no human mind, nor any sound mind, apprehends a human being