a statement because it is known to be true, for knowledge requires acceptance. If, however, it does not yield knowledge, accepting it requires some other reason. If it is accepted because it is widely held, then the syllogism is rhetorical, even if it yields neither knowledge nor probable belief. It is likewise rhetorical when its proposition is widely held, even if it does yield knowledge or probable belief. The same applies to the dialectical syllogism.

They sometimes illustrate widely held, accepted propositions that do not constitute knowledge with statements such as:

“Knowledge is good and ignorance is bad; justice is good and injustice is bad.”

These and similar rational judgments concerning conduct are affirmed by those who maintain that reason can discern good and evil. They claim that if we consult reason alone, we find no such judgment in it. They may also give as examples the propositions that an existent must either be separate from another existent or be co-located with it; that an existent must be situated in some direction; or that it must be capable of being seen. They claim that these are judgments of the estimative faculty, not of innate reason. They say: “For reason accepts premises through which the falsity of the original judgment becomes known.” All this is evident confusion to anyone who considers it carefully.

As for those propositions they call widely held but not known to be true, they are self-evident rational truths about which minds are more certain than they are about many truths of arithmetic and natural science. They are just as most Muslim theologians—indeed, most theologians throughout the world, of every persuasion—have said: self-evident rational propositions; but