are beyond the scope of this discussion—to say nothing of other Muslim groups, their scholars, and their leading authorities—as Judge Abū Bakr ibn al-Bāqillānī mentioned in his book al-Daqā’iq (The Subtleties).
As for the poetic syllogism, it serves merely to stimulate the imagination and stir the soul. This becomes clear from their division of syllogisms into five types: demonstrative, rhetorical, dialectical, poetic, and fallacious or sophistical. The sophistical resembles truth but is false: it is counterfeit wisdom. This is not our concern here; rather, our concern is with those three.
They say: “The dialectical syllogism is one whose premises the interlocutor concedes; the rhetorical is one whose premises are widely accepted among people; and the demonstrative is one whose premises are known to be true.”
Many premises, despite being rhetorical or dialectical—or even poetic—are also certain and demonstrative. They are called demonstrative insofar as they are known with certainty; rhetorical insofar as they are widely recognized and accepted by people generally; and dialectical insofar as a particular person concedes them.
This is the account given by those innovators among the Sabians who neither discussed prophethood nor addressed it by denying or affirming it. Failing to believe in the messengers and follow them is disbelief and misguidance, even if one does not believe them to be lying. Disbelief and misguidance are broader than declaring them liars.