created beings, and spoke contradictorily about justice and permissibility, as is well known of them. They also sought to bind others to numerous conclusions.

(Among these was their statement:

“If a person saw a group of companions wronging one another and could prevent them from doing so, yet did not prevent them, he would be unjust.” Yet the same does not constitute injustice on Allah’s part. They said: “He has forbidden them to do that and offered them the prospect of reward if they obey Him and punishment if they disobey Him. They have committed injustice by their own choice, and preventing them would only have been possible by compelling them to desist. Such compulsion removes the moral accountability through which He offered them the prospect of reward.”

The majority replied to them:

“If one of us did this while knowing that his slaves would neither obey his command nor refrain from injustice, but would instead become increasingly disobedient and unjust, that would be neither wise nor just. Such conduct on the part of one of us is praiseworthy only because he does not know the outcome or is unable to prevent the wrongdoing. Allah, however, knows all outcomes and has power over all things. Otherwise, if one of us knew that, were he to command them in order to offer them the prospect of reward, they would disobey him and wrong one another, he would be obliged to compel them to desist from injustice.”

A full discussion of this matter is set out elsewhere, for this reply allows only a brief indication.

It was also maintained by a group of those who affirm divine decree—among the earlier and later Jahmiyyah