resist, he is consenting rather than coerced. Hence the distinction between a woman who willingly engages in unlawful sexual intercourse and one who is forced into it.

The second category is someone who is coerced through beating, imprisonment, or the like until he acts. Such an act remains subject to religious responsibility, since he can refrain from it, even if he is killed as a result. Hence the jurists state that someone coerced into killing a person whose life is protected may not lawfully kill him. If he does kill him, however, they differ over retaliatory execution.

Most of them—including Mālik, Ahmad, and al-Shāfiʿī in one of his two opinions—hold that both the coerced person and the coercer are liable to retaliatory execution, because both participate in the killing. Abū Hanīfah holds that the wrongful coercer is liable, since the coerced person has become like an instrument. Zufar, however, holds that the coerced person who directly commits the killing is liable, because he is the direct perpetrator, whereas the other brings it about indirectly. He argues: “Had he been merely an instrument, he would not have been sinful, yet they agree that he is sinful.” Abū Yūsuf holds that neither is liable to retaliatory execution.

If, however, someone is coerced into drinking wine or performing similar acts, most of them permit him to do so. This is the position of Abū Hanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī, and the well-known position reported from Ahmad, on the basis of the words of Allah Most High:

“Do not force your slave girls into prostitution, if they wish to remain chaste, seeking the fleeting gains of this worldly life. And if anyone forces them, then after their being forced, Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.”

As for a man who is coerced into unlawful sexual intercourse, there are two opinions within the school of Ahmad and among others. The first is that he is not considered to have been coerced into it. This is the opinion of Abū Hanīfah and Ahmad’s explicitly stated position.