they involve presenting an objection from the Qadariyyah and their answer to it. They may say: “We affirm that He knows. In saying this, we have not denied divine decree; rather, we have affirmed it in the sense of knowledge, while denying that the Lord Most High wills all events and creates His servants’ deeds.” The poet says: “What the servant chooses has already been recorded, so he cannot do otherwise; compulsion therefore follows.”

This answer may be challenged as follows: the consequence here stands on the same footing as that which entails it. His knowledge that the servant will choose something accords with His recording that the servant will choose it, and altering knowledge is a greater matter than altering what is recorded.

It may also be said that he intended the recording to form part of the statement being rejected: one should not say, “He knew what the servant would choose and recorded it”—meaning that prior knowledge and recording suffice for belief in divine decree. These alone do not suffice for belief in divine decree. This is part of the argument advanced by those who affirm compulsion.

They say: “Anything contrary to what is known is impossible, so commanding it is commanding the impossible. For if the commanded act were to occur, knowledge would necessarily become ignorance.”

The answer to them is that “impossible” is an ambiguous term. If they mean that anything contrary to what is known will not happen or come to pass, this is correct. But requiring something that will not occur does not amount to requiring something the agent is incapable of doing. An agent may refrain from an act because he is incapable of it, or he may refrain because he does not will it. He is thus charged only with what he is capable of, even though the Lord knows