in goodness, nor by the imams of the Muslims—neither the four imams nor anyone else. Rather, all those who employed the terms “literal” and “figurative” while following the early generations in this fundamental matter say that the servant is truly an agent. The leading scholars among the followers of the four imams—Abū Hanīfah, Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal—and others explicitly affirmed this, and their books abound with such statements.

As for those who say that he is an agent only figuratively, and that the act does not subsist in the agent but is itself the thing brought about, their position necessarily implies that the servants’ acts have no agent: neither the Lord nor the servant. As for the servant, although the acts subsist in him, they hold that he is not their agent. As for the Lord, they hold that no act subsists in Him—neither these acts nor any others. Yet an agent, as intelligibly understood, is one in whom the act subsists, just as a speaker, as intelligibly understood, is one in whom speech subsists, and one who wills is one in whom will subsists. Likewise, one who is living, knowing, and capable is one in whom life, knowledge, and power subsist, and one who moves is one in whom motion subsists.

Thus, their affirmation of an agent in whom no act subsists is like the affirmation by their predecessors among the Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah of a speaker in whom no speech subsists, one who wills in whom no will subsists, one who knows in whom no knowledge subsists, and one who is capable in whom no power subsists. All of this is false, as they themselves have established in discussing “Allah’s speech” and the affirmation of “His attributes,” as has been explained at length in its proper place.

The principle on which they agreed with the imams of the Sunnah, and which they used as an argument against the Muʿtazilah, is this: when a quality subsists in a subject, the judgment it entails applies to that subject, and a name is derived from it for that subject; no name is derived from it for anything else. Its judgment applies to that subject and not to anything else. Similarly, when motion, blackness, whiteness, heat, or cold subsists in a subject, it is that subject which is