can conceivably exist in external reality, such as flight, and what is rationally impossible, such as combining two contradictories.

Those who claimed that obligations involving the intrinsically impossible have actually been imposed—such as al-Rāzī and others—argued that Allah charged Abū Lahab with believing, despite knowing and declaring that he would not believe. Thus, they argued, He required him to combine two contradictories: to perform the act and to affirm that he would not affirm it; his affirmation would be truthful if he did not affirm it. They also argued that he was charged with doing the contrary of what was known, and that the contrary of what was known is impossible. The obligation would therefore amount to requiring him to turn Allah’s knowledge into ignorance, which is intrinsically impossible.

These people treated the expression “beyond one’s ability” as a general term encompassing every act, since, according to them, ability exists only together with the act. They also included under it the contrary of what is known, what one is incapacitated from doing, and what is intrinsically impossible. They then presented some “ten arguments” to establish the permissibility of imposing obligations of this kind.

Once the matter is explained to them with these distinctions, however, it becomes clear that their claim that it is permissible to impose obligations that cannot be fulfilled owing to incapacity—whether the act is intrinsically impossible or possible—is false and unsupported by any evidence. As for the permissibility of charging a servant with acts of worship that he is able to perform—although they themselves say that he is able to perform them only when actually acting—everyone agrees that imposing such obligations is permissible. There is, however, both a terminological and a substantive dispute over whether this falls under what is “beyond one’s ability.”

Thus, what they have included under this designation comprises different categories: some involve disagreement over their permissibility or occurrence, and (others involve disagreement over their designation and characterization, not their occurrence.