in one. Indeed, the possibility of this is self-evident to reason. Moreover, it is self-evident to reason that all attributes—power and otherwise—are more perfect when the subject in which they subsist is unified and integrated than when it is multiple and dispersed. Thus, coming together and acting jointly give created beings strength and power that they do not possess when separated and acting individually, even if one of them remains. Indeed, individuals, limbs, and other separate bodies each possess a power. If they are supposed to be united and brought together, that power would be stronger and more perfect, because their union and combination would give it, within the bounds of possibility, something it lacked when they were separate and multiple. This shows that the power subsisting in two—if those two are supposed to be one thing—would be more perfect. How, then, could it fail to equal the power subsisting in two subjects?
It is known that, if two distinct subjects in which two powers subsist are supposed to be a single subject in which both powers subsist, the power would not thereby diminish but increase. Accordingly, what can possibly be brought about through the power of two separate agents would not diminish but increase if those very agents were supposed to be a single agent possessing what both possessed. It follows that each of them could possess the power to act independently, and that this is possible for it.
It has thus become clear that, where two agents jointly bring about a single effect, it is possible for each to have the power to bring it about. Indeed, it is possible for them to be a single thing with the power to bring it about. Thus, each could be more perfect than it presently is and could possess a different attribute.