actions possess neither qualities that constitute moral judgments nor qualities that serve as grounds for such judgments. Rather, the One who has power has commanded one of two identical alternatives rather than the other out of sheer will, not for any wise purpose or to secure any benefit in creation and command.

They say that it is possible for Allah to command associating partners with Him and forbid worshipping Him alone, and possible for Him to command injustice and indecencies and forbid righteousness and piety. The judgments used to characterize rulings are merely matters of relation and attribution. In their view, what is right is not right in itself, nor is what is wrong wrong in itself.

Rather, when He says:

“He commands them to do what is right and forbids them from what is wrong, makes lawful for them what is wholesome and forbids them what is foul,”

its actual meaning, according to them, is that he commands them to do what he commands them to do, forbids them from what he forbids them, makes lawful for them what he makes lawful, and forbids them what he forbids. Indeed, with regard to commanding, forbidding, making lawful and prohibiting, they hold that nothing is in reality right or wrong, wholesome or foul—unless such descriptions refer to what accords with natural dispositions. Yet, according to them, this does not entail that the Lord loves what is right and hates what is wrong.

This position and its implications are also weak, contrary to the Book, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the early generations and the jurists, as well as to sound reason. For Allah has declared Himself free of indecency, saying:

“Indeed, Allah does not command indecency.”

Likewise, He has declared Himself free of treating good and evil alike. The Exalted says:

“Or do those who commit evil deeds think that We will make them like those who believe and do righteous deeds, equal in their life and their death