The point here is that the question of “moral goodness and badness” is not inseparably linked to the question of divine decree. Once this is understood, people hold three positions on moral goodness and badness: two extremes and a middle position.

One extreme is the position of those who affirm goodness and badness as inherent, inseparable properties of an act, regarding revealed law as merely disclosing those properties, not as giving rise to any of them. This is the position of the Muʿtazilīs—and it is weak.

If this is combined with drawing an analogy between the Lord and His creation, so that one says, “Whatever is good when done by a created being is good when done by the Creator, and whatever is bad when done by a created being is bad when done by the Creator,” the false doctrines of the Qadarites follow, along with their discussions of permissibility and justice. They liken the Creator to created beings, and created beings to the Creator, in their actions. This position is false, just as likening the Creator to created beings, and created beings to the Creator, in their attributes is false.

The Jews attributed to Allah deficiencies from which He is far exalted, thereby likening Him to created beings: they described Him as poor, miserly, and subject to weariness. This is false, for the Lord, exalted is He, is free of every deficiency and possesses perfection without any deficiency. In His perfect attributes, He is far exalted above any of His attributes resembling any attribute of created beings. No one is His equal in any of His attributes: neither in His knowledge, nor His power, nor His will, nor His pleasure, nor His anger, nor His creating, nor His rising above, nor His coming, nor