all of it . . . (1), manifesting a command and a decree that He carries out. Will and command are thus each divided . . . (2), universal in occurrence and encompassing both categories, and into revealed law. Sometimes it is far off, and sometimes it halts . . . (3) the divine decree for it. All good lies in its taking effect; its occurrence is particular, distinguishing between the two categories and placing things in their proper ranks.

And if obedience and disobedience can rightly be attributed to the person in whom they are created—even if he creates the attributes—can a person reasonably say, “Black, red, tall, short, intelligent, dull, Arab, non-Arab,” thus attributing to someone all these qualities over which a human being has absolutely no choice, because they subsist in him and affect him, sometimes agreeably and sometimes disagreeably, yet then consider it implausible to attribute to him the action created in him through his intention and will, which are also created?

Then he says, “The servant has no part in evil.” Yet is it not all his? Indeed, these things belong to no one else; but Allah, glorified and exalted is He, created them for him. Attributing an action to its Creator and Originator does not preclude attributing it to the one whose action it is and in whom it subsists—the one who performs and acquires it. We have already explained what constitutes blameworthy compulsion.

We conclude this discussion with a brief explanation of the distinction between creation and acquisition.

We say: Creation encompasses two meanings: first, origination and bringing into being; second, determining measure and giving form.