The precise distinction is that a person may possess the first kind of capacity—the capacity recognized by religious law, which precedes the action. Allah, too, has power to do otherwise than what He knows and wills will occur; otherwise, His power would extend only to what He actually does. A person does not, however, possess such ability through the capacity accompanying the action, for nothing occurs except what Allah knows and wills will occur. Whatever Allah wills comes to pass, and whatever He does not will does not come to pass. Likewise, when the disciples said:
“Can your Lord send down to us a table spread from heaven?”
they were asking only about this latter capacity. The same applies to Jonah’s thought that We would not exercise power over him [i.e., interpreted](*) in terms of ability. This is like asking someone, “Can you do such-and-such?” meaning, “Will you do it?” Such usage is common in ordinary speech.
When the Qadariyyah held that the first capacity suffices for the action to occur and that a person brings his own will into existence, they made him independent of Allah at the moment of acting. Conversely, when the Jabriyyah held that the second capacity necessitates the action and comes from someone other than the person himself, they regarded him as compelled to act. Both are grave errors. A person does have a will, but it is subject to Allah’s will, as Allah states in several places in His Book:
“So whoever wills may take heed.”
“But they will not take heed unless Allah wills.”
“So whoever wills may take a path to his Lord.”
“But you do not will unless Allah wills.”
“For whoever among you wills to follow the straight path.”
“But you do not will unless Allah, Lord of all worlds, wills.”
Since Allah has made a person someone who wills and chooses, it is impossible to say that he is compelled and coerced while he has been made to possess a will. It is equally impossible that he himself originated his own will. If it is said that he is compelled to choose and forced to will, this has no parallel