and others like them. This is permissible. The Muʿtazilah held that imposing obligations beyond one’s capacity is impermissible.” He said: “This issue serves as a foundation for the present one.”

I say:

This consensus is that of the jurists and the scholars, for a group of speculative theologians held that requiring what is intrinsically impossible does occur in the Sharīʿah. This was the view of al-Rāzī and a group before him. They claimed that the obligations imposed on Abū Lahab and others fall into this category, since he was required to believe the revealed reports, which included the report that he would not believe. This is mistaken. For if, after the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—has called someone to faith, Allah declares that he will not believe and will burn in the Fire, then the decree of punishment has become binding upon him. Like someone who sees the angels at the moment of death, he is no longer addressed by the Messenger with these two contradictory demands.

Likewise, whoever maintains that imposing an obligation on someone incapable of fulfilling it necessarily occurs, citing His words:

“On the Day when a shin will be laid bare, and they will be called to prostrate but will be unable to do so,”

contradicts this consensus. The substance of the consensus is that this does not occur in the Sharīʿah. Moreover, such an address serves only to demonstrate their inability, as punishment for their failure to prostrate while they were sound and able. They are punished for neglecting worship when they were capable of it by being commanded to perform it when they are incapable. An address of punishment and recompense is of the same kind as a creative command: the capacity of the person addressed is not a condition, since the aim is not for him to perform the act. Once these types and categories are made clear, confusion and ambiguity disappear.