unqualified denial of what Allah and His Messenger have affirmed, and unqualified affirmation of what Allah and His Messenger have denied.

The second principle concerns matters agreed to be beyond a person’s capacity, but concerning which there is disagreement over whether they may be imposed as obligations. These fall into two categories: what is impossible in the ordinary course of things, such as walking on one’s face, flying, and the like; and what is intrinsically impossible, such as combining two opposites. As previously mentioned, there are three views on whether imposing such obligations is rationally admissible. As for whether this occurs in the Sharīʿah or is admissible under it, the scholars who transmit the Sharīʿah agree that nothing of this kind occurs in it. Several scholars have reported a consensus on this, including Abū al-Hasan ibn al-Zāghūnī, who said:

“Section: Imposing obligations beyond one’s capacity. This is of two kinds:

(First): Imposing an obligation beyond one’s capacity because of incapacity, the opposite of ability. Examples include requiring someone unable to stand to stand, or requiring a blind person to write and add dots to a written text, and similar cases. Such obligations may not be imposed, and consensus has been established on this. This is because the absence of capacity in these cases is treated as equivalent to impossibility and inconceivability, placing the act beyond one’s power. Imposing such an obligation is therefore inadmissible.

(Second): Imposing an obligation beyond one’s capacity, but not because of incapacity, the opposite of ability. An example is imposing an obligation on a disbeliever whom Allah already knew would not welcome the obligation, such as Pharaoh and Abū Jahl