punishments, although they cannot sustain this in practice. They act upon it only when it accords with their desires, as did the Arab polytheists. Then, whenever someone’s desires are opposed, he rises to resist that opposition, transgressing all bounds and observing no limit—just as the polytheists also used to do. This approach becomes self-contradictory when human wills conflict: one person wants something, while another wants its opposite, and both wills are divinely decreed. One must therefore give precedence to one of them, to some alternative, or to each in a particular respect; otherwise, chaos necessarily follows. The adherents of this approach may go to such extremes that they identify existing things themselves with Allah, as has been discussed elsewhere.

They invoke conformity with Allah’s decretive will to justify the evil deeds committed by themselves and others, as in al-Harīrī’s statement:

“I disbelieve in a Lord who is disobeyed.”

Likewise, when one of his companions was invited by a toll collector and was told, “He is a toll collector,” he replied:

“Even if he has disobeyed the command, he has obeyed the will.”

And Ibn Isrā’īl said:

“I am now subject to whatever He chooses for me;
Thus all my deeds are acts of obedience.”

They sometimes call this “reality,” considering it the reality of lordship, the reality that actually exists, or descriptive reality. Since these people have an admixture of Christianity, and Christians have an admixture of polytheism, they followed the polytheists in invoking divine decree in opposition to the revealed law. This is despite their worshipping others besides Allah, who decreed all that exists; these people, too, have an admixture of that.