As for our statement, “Every contingent being has a cause that necessitates its existence, and everything brought into being has something that brings it into being,” it indicates only an originator and a cause that necessitates existence—a universal description that can apply to more than one. Thus, a rational syllogism does not identify a particular entity; it indicates only an unrestricted universal, so particular identification is still required. A syllogism therefore establishes an unrestricted, universal description.

Moreover, if one argues for the Maker from their contingency, their temporal origination, or both together, this does not require a universal syllogism stating, “Everything brought into being must have something that brings it into being,” or, “Every contingent being must have a cause that necessitates its existence,” much less a demonstration of these two premises. Rather, the heart’s knowledge of the dependence of this contingent being and this temporally originated being is like its knowledge of the dependence of this contingent being and this temporally originated being. Knowledge of what holds true of particular entities is not derived from universal knowledge encompassing them. Indeed, the mind may know what holds true of a particular entity before knowing the general, universal rule.

Similarly, knowing that ten is twice five does not depend upon knowing that every number that has two halves is twice its two halves.

In keeping with this is His statement:

“Or were they created by nothing, or were they the creators?”

Jubayr ibn Mut‘im said, “When I heard it, I felt my heart split apart.” This is a rhetorical question denying the possibility: “Were they brought into existence without an originator?” They know that they did not come into being without someone bringing them into being, and they know that they did not bring themselves into being. Their knowledge of what holds true of themselves is self-evident through their innate disposition. It does not need to be established by arguing that every existent is temporally originated, or that no contingent being exists by itself or without someone bringing it into existence. Although this general proposition concerning the class is true, knowledge of that specific, particular case, if it does not precede knowledge of the general proposition, is neither subsequent to it nor less clear.