is deficiency, just as the existence of what ought not to exist is deficiency. Thus, it is clear that the existence of these things when wisdom requires their absence is the deficiency—not their absence.

For this reason, the Lord, exalted is He, is described by affirmative attributes that embody His perfection, and by negative attributes that likewise necessarily imply His perfection. The absence of whatever is negated of Him is therefore an aspect of perfection, just as the presence of whatever is rightly affirmed of Him is an aspect of perfection. Once this is understood concerning attributes, the same applies to actions and the like. Not every addition the mind conceives is an aspect of perfection; rather, many additions detract from the perfection of that to which they are added, as can be understood in the case of many existing things. For a human being, the presence of certain things at one time may constitute a deficiency and a fault, while at another time it constitutes perfection and is praiseworthy, just as something may harm him at one time and benefit him at another.

(Fifth: If we suppose one who is able to bring about temporal events for a wise purpose and another who is unable to do so, it is self-evident to reason that the one who is able is more perfect. Yet temporal events can exist only as things that come into being; they cannot be beginningless. If the ability to bring this about is more perfect, and what this ability produces can only be something that comes into being, then its existence is perfection, while its absence beforehand contributes to complete perfection. For the absence of what is impossible, which is a prerequisite for the existence of perfection, is itself an aspect of perfection.

They are divided here into three groups:

One group says that His will, love, pleasure, and the like are beginningless: He has always been pleased with those whom He knows will die as believers, and He has always been displeased with those whom He knows will die