that is separate from it, even though, in his view, the servants’ power does not extend beyond its locus. Thus, when they saw the contradictions inherent in this position, Qādī Abū Bakr resorted to one view, Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī to another, and Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī to yet another. This is discussed at length in its proper place; the purpose here is merely to draw attention to it.
Among the subtle points in this discussion is that expressions such as “causal efficacy,” “compulsion,” and “provision” are general terms. If someone asks, “Does the servant’s power have an effect upon its object or not?” he should first be told that the term “power” encompasses two kinds:
The first is the capacity recognized by the Law, which enables action and forms the basis for commands and prohibitions. (The second is the capacity determined by the divine decree, which necessarily brings about the act and is simultaneous with it: the act does not lag behind this capacity.
The first is what is mentioned in the words of Allah Most High:
“Pilgrimage to the House is a duty owed to Allah by those who are able to make their way to it.”
If this ability were the capacity simultaneous with the act, pilgrimage to the House would be obligatory only upon those who actually performed it. Someone who did not perform pilgrimage would therefore not be disobedient for abandoning it, whether he had provisions and a mount and was capable of performing pilgrimage or not.
The same applies to the Prophet’s words—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—to ʿImrān ibn Husayn:
“Pray standing; if you cannot, then sitting; and if you cannot, then on your side.”
Likewise, Allah Most High says:
“So fear Allah as much as you are able.”
And the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said:
“When I command you to do something, do as much of it as you are able.”
Had he meant an ability that exists only alongside the act, he would effectively have said, “Do as much of it as you actually do.” Thus, someone who did nothing would not be disobedient