that entails their coming into being, or not?

If it is said that no cause has arisen, this entails a preference without a determining factor. If it is said that a cause has arisen, this entails an infinite regress, as explained above.

(The second argument demonstrating the falsity of their position is as follows:

The substance of the argument is that, unless there is an eternal cause, either an infinite regress or a preference without a determining factor must follow. Yet you consider an infinite regress possible. Indeed, their fundamental position is that these temporal occurrences form an infinite succession, one after another, and that the movements of the celestial sphere prepare receptive substrates for newly arising forms to emanate upon them from the eternal cause—whether you say that this cause is the active intellect or the Necessary Being, from whom they proceed through the intellects or other intermediaries. Since you consider an infinite regress possible, temporal occurrences could arise from something other than a cause that necessarily entails its effect, even if this involves an infinite regress. Indeed, this is better, in light of both revelation and reason, than your position.

For revelation states that Allah created the heavens and the earth in six days. This is agreed upon by the adherents of the religious communities: Muslims, Jews, and Christians.

If it is said that He created them through a cause that had come into being before that, this would be better, in light of revelation, than your claim that they are eternal and have existed with Him from all eternity. It would also be preferable on rational grounds, for reason provides no evidence that these celestial spheres are eternal that could stand against revelation. This rational argument establishes only that nothing comes into being except through a cause that has itself come into being. Thus, if it is said that Allah Most High created the heavens and the earth through something that had come into being before that, your rational argument contains nothing that disproves this.

(The third argument is as follows:

The coming into being of one temporal occurrence after another without limit is either rationally possible or impossible. If it is rationally impossible, it follows that all temporal occurrences