in their view, a man who lies whenever he speaks, breaks his promises, and betrays whatever is entrusted to him—persistently lying, betraying trusts, and breaking covenants, never prostrating once to Allah, never doing anyone a single kindness, never fulfilling a trust, and committing every lie, injustice, and indecency within his power—is nevertheless a believer whose faith is complete, equal to the faith of the prophets.

This consequence follows for everyone who does not hold that outward deeds are necessary consequences of inward faith. Once someone affirms that they are its necessary consequences, and that inward faith necessarily entails outward righteous deeds, whether those deeds are necessary consequences of what is denoted by faith or are part of it becomes (a merely verbal dispute, as explained earlier).

(Sixth): Their position entails that someone who willingly prostrates to the cross and idols, deliberately throws a copy of the Quran into a latrine, kills a person unjustly, kills everyone he sees praying, sheds the blood of everyone he sees performing pilgrimage to the House, and does to the Muslims what the Qarmatians did, may nevertheless be a believer and an ally of Allah, with faith equal to that of the prophets and the utterly truthful. For inward faith is either incompatible with these acts or it is not. If it is not incompatible with them, they can coexist with it; thus, they can occur only in the absence of inward faith. If, however, these acts are incompatible with inward faith, refraining from them is something faith necessarily entails, requires, and brings about. Thus, only someone who refrains from these acts can possess the required inward faith. Whoever does not refrain from them thereby demonstrates the corruption of his inward faith. And if deeds and acts of abstention