from faith itself.

Second: They held that those known to be disbelievers—such as Iblīs, Pharaoh, the Jews, Abū Tālib, and others—were disbelievers only because their conduct necessarily implied a lack of inward assent. This flies in the face of reason and direct observation. Likewise, they held that hating and envying the Messenger out of aversion to his religion necessarily implies not knowing that he is truthful, and made other similar claims.

(Third): They held that uttering words of disbelief—such as reviling Allah and His Messenger, professing the Trinity, and the like—may coexist with the reality of faith within the heart, and that someone who does this may truly be a believer in Allah’s sight, destined for bliss in the Hereafter. The falsity of this is necessarily known from the religion of Islam.

(Fourth): They held that someone who never professes faith, despite being able to do so, and never performs any outward act of obedience to Allah, despite being obliged and able to do so, may nevertheless be a believer in Allah whose faith is complete, destined for bliss in the Hereafter. These outrageous positions are peculiar to the Jahmiyyah, as distinct from the Murji’ah among the jurists and others.

(Fifth): This objection applies both to them and to the Murji’ah: they said that a person may be a believer whose faith is complete, equal to the faith of the prophets and the utterly truthful, even if he does no good—neither praying, maintaining ties of kinship, nor speaking truthfully—and commits every major sin without exception. It follows that