, the highest of which is saying, ‘There is no deity worthy of worship except Allah,’ and the lowest is removing something harmful from the road; and modesty is a branch of faith.” What a term denotes when paired with another is more properly called figurative than what it denotes when used alone and without qualification.

Second, he should be told: There is no disagreement that outward deeds are an offshoot of the inward state, necessitate it, and are entailed by it. But are they included in what the term denotes and constitute part of it, or are they a necessary accompaniment to it, like an extrinsic condition or a consequent effect?

It is well known that religious and legal terms, such as “prayer,” “zakah,” “pilgrimage,” and the like, denote—by agreement of the jurists—the entirety of prayer and pilgrimage as prescribed by Islamic law. Some maintain that such a term denotes only what it ordinarily denotes in the language, and that whatever the Lawgiver has added is merely an additional legal requirement and a condition, rather than part of what the term denotes. This was the position of al-Qādī Abū Bakr ibn al-Tayyib, al-Qādī Abū Yaʿlā, and those who agreed with them: Islamic law introduced additional legal requirements, making them conditions relating to intention, deeds, and supplication, without including them in what the terms “pilgrimage,” “fasting,” and “prayer” denote. Their view is regarded as the weaker one by the jurists and the great majority of those associated with religious learning. Hence, the majority of the followers of the four imams oppose this view.

Thus, if someone says that the term “faith” denotes nothing more than assent, while its being assent to Allah, His angels, His Books, and His messengers, and its necessarily entailing love for Allah and His Messenger and the like, are conditions of the legal ruling rather than part of what the term denotes—then this view, if not weaker than the preceding one, is no less weak. The same applies to someone who says, “Outward deeds