as conceived by the mind, then it admits of neither differences nor degrees. Yet this exists only in minds, not in external reality. Many who discuss the principles of jurisprudence have fallen into a similar error, denying that intellect, obligation, or prohibition admit of degrees. This denial is the position of Judge Abū Bakr, Ibn ‘Aqīl, and others like them. The majority, however, hold the opposite view, which is the position of Abū al-Hasan al-Tamīmī, Abū Muhammad al-Barbahārī, Judge Abū Ya‘lā, Abū al-Khattāb, and others. A similar error befell the logicians and philosophers, and those speculative theologians and proponents of union who followed them, in affirming the oneness and unity of the Necessary Existent. It ultimately led them to conclusions that entail sheer negation, as we have explained elsewhere.

The Greek logicians are inconsistent on this matter: one of them asserts a proposition and also asserts its contradictory, as detailed in the relevant discussion. Here we shall address what pertains to the present subject. We say—and there is no power nor strength except through Allah—that the discussion concerns “two aspects”:

First: Does the absence of one branch of faith necessarily entail the absence of the others?

Second: Does the presence of one necessarily entail the presence of the others?