his deeds on the Day of Resurrection will be prayer. If he has performed it in full, all is well; otherwise it will be said: ‘See whether he has any voluntary prayers.’ If he has, his obligatory prayer will be completed with them. Then the rest of his deeds will be treated in the same manner.”

It is evident that the shortfall thus made good cannot consist in omitting something recommended, since omitting a recommended act requires no compensation. Moreover, there would then be no difference between the recommended act omitted and the one performed. Thus, it is clear that deficiencies in obligatory acts are made good through voluntary acts.

This does not contradict the statement that Allah does not accept voluntary worship until the obligatory duty has been discharged. Even if this statement contradicted the first report, the first would have to be given precedence, since it is more firmly established and better known. The latter report is singular in its attribution to the Prophet; what is well known is that it occurs in Abū Bakr’s counsel to ʿUmar. Ahmad mentioned it in his Treatise on Prayer.

The explanation is that acceptance of voluntary worship here means receiving its reward. It is evident that one is not rewarded for voluntary worship until the obligatory duty has been discharged: if someone performs a voluntary act while the obligatory act remains deficient, it makes good and completes that deficiency. It therefore carries no reward as a voluntary act. For this reason, one of the early Muslims said:

“Worship is truly additional only for the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, because Allah has forgiven his past and future sins, whereas others need forgiveness.”

He understood Allah’s words in this sense:

“And during part of the night, rise in prayer with it as an additional prayer for you.”

Yet it does not follow that, whenever someone performs a voluntary act while neglecting an obligation, the voluntary act replaces the obligatory one without qualification. Rather, the punishment for neglecting the obligation may be greater than the reward for the voluntary act.

If it is said: “When a servant sleeps through a prayer or forgets it, he must perform it when he remembers, according to the explicit text and scholarly consensus. If voluntary prayers could replace it, making it up would not be obligatory.”

The answer is: “This is mistaken. If this argument is advanced, it can be applied to all the means by which punishment is averted. Thus, one might say: ‘If a servant